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~
The following essay was delivered as the
Presidential Address at the 53rd Annual
Meeting of the National Academy of
Arbitrators in San Francisco in June 2000.

A quarter century ago, in a presentation at the
Academy's annual meeting, I used the phrase
"contract reader" to characterize the role an
arbitrator plays in construing a collective
bargaining agreement. That two-word phrase
may be the only thing I ever said before this
body that has been remembered. Unfortunately,
it is almost invariably misunderstood. Time and
again members have reproached me: "What's the
big deal about contract reading, anyway? Isn't it
just the same as contract interpretation?" Or,
more substantively scathing: "Do you really
think, Ted, that all you have to do to interpret a
labor agreement is to read it?!"
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Those two masters of contract
interpretation, Arthur Corbin and Carlton
Snow, know that context is nearly
everything in extracting meaning from a
set of words. When I spoke of the
"contract reader" years ago, it was in the
context of a paper dealing with judicial
review of an arbitrator's award. The
process of contract interpretation as such
was not my concern. I had a simple, but I
like to think important point to make.
When a court has before it an arbitrator's
award applying a collective bargaining
agreement, it is just as if the employer and
the union had signed a stipulation stating:
"What the arbitrator says this contract
means is exactly what we meant it to say.
That is what we intended by agreeing the
award would be 'final and binding.'" In
this sense, an "erroneous interpretation" of
the contract by the arbitrator is a
contradiction in terms.
Now, my Law School colleague Yale
Kamisar, who has had more of his books
and articles cited by the U.S. Supreme
Court than any other contemporary
scholar, advises us legal scribblers that it
is not enough to have a sound idea. "To
make a lasting impression," says Yale,
"you must couch your ideas in memorable
language." So, way back in 1977, I tried
my best to come up with a catchy phrase
to convey my notion about the
relationship between arbitrators and the
contracts they are asked to interpret.
What could be more apt than to get a
court to think of the arbitrator as simply
picking up the parties' agreement and
"reading it off' as easily and
straightforwardly as A-B-C? Yale didn't tell
us, however, that sometimes you can
succeed too well. The audience may
remember your catchy phrase - and
entirely forget your point!
Today, I am going to take two quite
different tacks. First, I shall update the
thesis I thought I was communicating to
you nearly 25 years ago. The emphasis
will be on what may be the hottest issue
in judicial review, namely, when may a
court set aside an arbitral award on the
grounds it violates public policy. Second,
in response to your overwhelming
demand, I'd like to talk a little about what
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many of you thought I was trying to say
all along, namely, how should an
arbitrator go about "reading," or
interpreting, a contract.

Judicial review
of arbitration awards
The story begins, of course, with David
Feller's great triumph in the Steelworkers
Trilogy (Steelworkers v. American
Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 [1960];
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co.,
363 U.S. 574 [1960]; and Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 [1960]). There, the Supreme Court
made arbitration the linchpin in the
federal scheme for the implementation of
collective bargaining agreements. More
specifically, for our purposes, the Court in
one of the three cases, Enterprise Wheel,
imposed tight constraints on judicial
review of arbitral awards. So long as the
award is not the product of fraud or
corruption, does not exceed the
arbitrator's authority under the parties'
submission, and "draws its essence" from
the labor contract, a court is to enforce
the award without any attempt to "review
the merits." Despite these strictures, the
itch of the judiciary to right seeming
wrongs has compelled the Court to revisit
the subject, most notably in Paperworkers
v. Misco Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
Misco presented the public policy
question in dramatic fashion. The Fifth
Circuit had refused to enforce an
arbitrator's reinstatement of an employee
whose job was operating a dangerous
paper-cutting machine, and whose car had
been found to contain marijuana while in
the company parking lot. The Supreme
Court reversed, declaring that "as long as
the arbitrator is even arguably construing
or applying the contract and acting within
the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision."
The Court naturally recognized the

general common law doctrine that no
contract in contravention of law or public
policy will be enforced. But it cautioned
that "a court's refusal •to enforce an
arbitrator's interpretation of [labor]
contracts is limited to situations where the
contract as interpreted would violate
'some explicit public policy' that is 'well
defined and dominant, and is to be
ascertained by reference to the laws and
legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public
interests."'
Many lower courts have still not got
the message. Judges have been so
offended by the reinstatement of deviant
postal workers, sexual harassers, and
alcoholic airline pilots that they have
disregarded the directives of Enterprise
and Misco. Unfortunately and
unaccountably, the Supreme Court has
not seen fit to step in and insist that its
dictates be followed. Thus, the First and
Fifth Circuits have taken it upon
themselves to find an award at odds with
their notions of public policy, even
though the action ordered, such as a
reinstatement, would not have violated
any positive law or established public
policy if it had been taken by the
employer on its own initiative. The
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
D.C. Circuits have been far more faithful
to the Misco mandate. The Second, Third,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have
vacillated on the issue, but the most
recent decisions seem more in line
with Misco.
Because I consider it one of the easier
issues in arbitration, however much
misunderstood by a number of courts, I
shall deal brusquely with the rejection of
otherwise legitimate awards on the basis
of a nebulous public policy. That usually
comes down to the highly subjective
feelings of particular judges. For me, three
estimable critics have correctly assessed
the problem and arrived at the right
solution. In various formulations, Judge
Frank Easterbrook and Professors Charles
Craver and David Feller have concluded
that if the employer (or the employer in
conjunction with the union) has the
lawful authority to take unilaterally the

action directed by the arbitrator, such as
reinstatement of a wrongdoing employee,
the arbitral award should be upheld
against public policy claims. If the airline
would not have violated the regulations of
the Federal Aviation Administration by
putting the rehabilitated, re-licensed
alcoholic pilot back in the cockpit, the
arbitrators award to that effect is valid and
enforceable.
That approach is entirely in keeping
with the underlying notion that the
arbitrator is the parties' surrogate, their
designated spokesperson in reading and
applying the contract. What the parties
are entitled to say or do on their own, the
arbitrator is entitled to say or order. That
simple principle seems so self-evident,
and so implicit in the Supreme Court's
rulings to date, that it should become the
accepted norm in the future. This would
merely confirm arbitration as the "final
and binding" dispute resolution procedure
that the parties' contracts almost
invariably denominate it.
We may shortly have further
enlightenment from the Supreme Court
on this long-running debate. In March
2000 certiorari was granted in Eastern
Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers. This
was another instance of marijuana
ingestion by a worker in a hazardous
occupation, here, a mobile equipment
operator. In sustaining the arbitrator's
reinstatement, the lower courts
acknowledged that Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations
expressed a "well defined and dominant
public policy" against drug use by "those
in safety-sensitive positions." But the court
of appeals went on to say: "[T]here is no
such policy against the reinstatement of
employees who have used illegal drugs in
the past."
In short, the key is whether the
remedial action ordered by the arbitrator,
not the triggering conduct of the
employee, is contrary to public policy Of
course, the drug-taking employee acted
contrary to public policy But the awardissuing arbitrator did not and his decision
should stand. Indeed, recognizing the
possibility of the rehabilitation of

"What the arbitrator
says this contract means
is exactly what we meant it to
say. That is what we intended by
agreeing the award would be
'final and binding."' In this
sense, an "erroneous
interpretation" of the contract
by the arbitrator is a
contradiction in terms.
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wrongdoers is a hallmark of a humane
and caring society. Despite the ominous
implications of a grant of certiorari when
the court of appeals did not even deign to
publish its opinion, that is the way the
Supreme Court should rule in this case.
In addition to overturning awards on
public policy grounds, judges will not
uphold an arbitrator's decision if it
stretches beyond some line of rationality.
Courts that proclaim their allegiance to
the Enterprise and Misco principles will
balk at enforcing an award they find has
"no rational basis" because, for example,
it ignores the "plain meaning" of the
contract. Regrettably, I cannot say that
vacating an arbitral award on grounds of
irrationality is contrary to the contract
reader thesis. In the parties' final and
binding arbitration agreement, they
presumably took it for granted not only
that arbitrators would be untainted by
fraud or corruption, but also that they
would not be insane and their decisions
not totally without reason. In any event,
it is probably impossible to keep courts
from intervening, on one theory or
another, when an arbitration award is
deemed so distorted as to reflect utter
irrationality, if not temporary insanity.
One can only hope that the careful, artful
crafting of arbitral opinions will keep this
judicial exception to the finality doctrine
to the barest minimum.

~
Contract ''reading"
as contract
interpretation
From what I have said, judges should
have an easy time enforcing most arbitral
awards. Instead, they make it hard on
themselves. If they would just take our
word for what a contract means, they
would have far fewer problems. We are
the ones with the tough job. How should
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arbitrators go about divining the parties'
"intent" when the reality is they never
contemplated the particular issue that has
now arisen? What do we do when a "plain
meaning" conflicts with bargaining history
or established practice?
Two splendid articles by our colleagues
Carlton Snow and Richard Mittenthal do I dare apply that over-used term
"definitive" to them7 - have said nearly
all that needs to be said about plain
meaning and past practice. Carlton is, for
him, uncharacteristically blunt:
"Arbitrators' continued invocation of the
plain meaning rule is anomalous in light
of the trend to reject the rule by the
courts, the U.C.C. [Uniform Commercial
Code], the Restatement [of Contracts],
and treatise writers." Dick was prepared to
declare, almost 40 years ago, that past
practice "may be used to clarify what is
ambiguous, to give substance to what is
general, and perhaps even to modify or
amend what is seemingly unambiguous."
The rest of my remarks will mostly be
embroidery upon the lessons of these
masters.
Despite the teachings of Snow and
Mittenthal, numerous arbitrators of high
repute have accepted or at least paid lip
service to the plain meaning rule and its
benighted first cousin, the parol evidence
rule. In most cases this may cause little
harm, at least as to the result. After all, we
properly begin our interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement with the
language of the contract, and often we can
end there. But one of the great modern
state supreme court justices, Roger
Traynor of California, put his finger on
the problem when he said:
"A rule that would limit the
determination of the meaning of a written
instrument to its four-corners merely
because it seems to the court to be clear
and unambiguous, would either deny the
relevance of the intention of the parties or
presuppose a degree of verbal precision
and stability our language has not
attained."
Put differently, if fidelity to the parties'
intent (or their putative intent about a
problem they never anticipated) is the
touchstone of sound contract
interpretation, the a priori rejection of any

evidence reasonably probative of that
intent cannot be justified. In collective
bargaining, what I would call "contextual
interpretation" is likely to be grounded in
evidence concerning negotiating history
and past practice.
In recent decisions, arbitrators have
frequently been prepared to look behind
what might appear the plain meaning of
the written instrument to discern intent
from bargaining history and other parol
evidence. Of course, arbitrators sometimes
play it safe by finding an ambiguity in the
language as written, which makes their
resort to extrinsic evidence quite
conventional. But the arbitrators'
ambiguity is often the parties' clear and
unambiguous provision, sustaining the
latters' respective opposing positions.
Logically, there seems no reason not to
take a final step. If the parties, for reasons
sufficient unto themselves - for example,
concealing trade secrets from an
employer's competitors - decided to
cloak certain provisions of the collective
agreement in a private code, an arbitrator
should entertain evidence to that effect,
however clear and unambiguous the
language might otherwise appear.
Professor Corbin is in accord. Needless to
say, in any case where one party alleges
and the other denies the use of such a
private code, the arbitrator is going to be
skeptical that ordinary English has been
thus stood on its head, and demand pretty
convincing proof of the claim.
That brings us to consider the most
practical argument in favor of the plain
meaning rule - the time and cost of
trying to prove that what seems on its face
clear and unambiguous is not. Yet here, as
in so many other instances, I believe the
solution has to be the sound discretion of
the arbitrator. I would not reject out of
hand an offer to prove that the apparently
clear and unambiguous was in fact
intended to mean something totally
different. But I would refuse proffered
evidence that merely reflected one party's
internal, uncommunicated understandings
of contract terms, and I would give short
shrift to testimony or exhibits that were

~=========================== ~ ~====i

""Defensive" treatment of
external law
and public policy
vague and not directly on target. The
language finally chosen by the parties to
embody their agreement is entitled to that
much respect.
Today's major issue concerning past
practice is whether it can modify or
override clear contractual language to the
contrary. My sense is that a long-standing
and well-accepted practice may prevail
even over a "clear" and "express"
provision in the agreement. There is also
substantial authority, however, that past
practice cannot trump an unambiguous
contract term. Employers have responded
to the encroachments of past practice by
seeking various types of "zipper" clauses
designed to make the final written
agreement the exclusive source of
employee rights. Arbitrators are divided
on the efficacy of this approach.
All these past practice cases are highly
fact-specific. Generalizations are

Today's major issue
concerning past practice
is whether it can modify
or override clear
contractual language to
the contrary. My sense is
that a long-standing and
well-accepted practice
may prevail even over a
"clear" and
"express"
-~ro · ·
agre

hazardous. But in my view two
fundamental principles are apposite. First,
any contract, including a collective
bargaining agreement, is subject to
amendment by the parties to it. Second,
for a practice to become sufficiently well
established to be binding on the parties, it
must meet the usual criteria of (1) clarity,
(2) consistency, (3) longevity, and (4)
mutual acceptability Mutual acceptability
is especially crucial if the practice is
claimed to have superseded a clear,
express contract provision to the contrary
If all the conditions are properly met,
however, the practice should prevail. The
parties are in control of their agreement
and, absent statutory or contractual
restrictions, they can fashion it or amend
it just as well by deeds as by words.
Arbitrators are simply following the
parties' lead in acting accordingly

Let me append a few words about the
treatment of arbitration cases presenting
issues of public policy or external law
generally Once a great debate raged
within the Academy over what an
arbitrator should do when confronted
with a conflict between the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement and the
requirements of external law. I still believe
that, theoretically, in the very rare case
where there is an irreconcilable clash
between the contract and law (or
"dominant public policy"), and the parties
have not authorized the arbitrator,
expressly or impliedly, to take external
law into account, the arbitrator should
follow the contract and ignore the law.
That is the parties' commission and the
limit of the arbitrator's authority.
Nonetheless, as a practical matter,
external law and public policy are now
daily grist for the arbitration mills. This is
especially true of civil rights statutes and
the vital protections they provide against
discrimination in employment on the
grounds of race, sex, religion, age,
disability, and the like. In the collective
bargaining context, arbitrators are
constantly applying anti-discrimination
clauses covering such categories. An
arbitral award in these situations, where
statutory rights are implicated, is of
course not entitled to the same final and
binding effect that is customary in pure
contract arbitrations. But under the nowfamous footnote 21 in Alezander v.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974), an
arbitration decision in discrimination
cases may be admitted in any subsequent
court proceedings, and accorded "great
weight" if certain conditions are met.
Those include contractual provisions that
"conform substantially with [the
applicable statute]," "procedural fairness,"
"adequacy of the record," and the "special
competence of particular arbitrators."
All of us, advocates and arbitrators
alike, have a professional responsibility to
ensure compliance with these Supreme
Court standards in mixed contractualstatutory arbitrations. Employers, unions,
and employees should not have to spend
time and money wastefully To the extent
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the law allows, arbitral awards ought to
constitute a final disposition of the
discrimination claims. In practice, much
will depend on the losing party's
assessment of its chance of securing a
more favorable result in the courts. To
promote finality, advocates in preparing
their arguments and arbitrators in making
their decisions must keep the GardnerDenver factors in mind. I am going to take
"procedural fairness" for granted. The
others require deliberate attention. The
anti-discrimination provisions of the
contract may closely track the
corresponding statute, but there are now
extensive judicial glosses on all this
legislation. The advocates should educate
the arbitrator on the nuances of their
particular case. In turn, the arbitrators
should demonstrate their awareness of the
applicable law and pertinent court
interpretations. That will also serve to
establish their "special competence." This
could often require more than the two or
three pages often specified for expedited
arbitrations.
Thus, in all the steps of a discrimination
case, right through to the writing of any
briefs and the decision, the advocates and
the arbitrator should act "defensively."
They ought to envisage a federal judge
looking over their shoulder, scrutinizing
their every move and testing it against the
Gardner-Denver criteria. That should be
enough to sharpen up everybody's skill at
contract (or statute) reading!
An analogous approach should be
followed in the "public policy" cases. If a
sexual harasser or a drug offender in a
safety-sensitive job is involved, the
advocates and in particular the arbitrator
ought not turn a blind eye to the policy
implications. Judicial review is a distinct
possibility. The arbitrator would enhance
the likelihood of the awards being
sustained by forthrightly confronting the
policy issues and explaining convincingly
why the result reached is compatible with
the public good. This is a long way from
the almost totally autonomous, private
domain of labor arbitration we once knew,
but I think it accurately reflects the
demands of the new age in which we
find ourselves.
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Conclusion
In interpreting and enforcing a labor
agreement, the roles of arbitrators and
courts are very different. The arbitrator is
the parties' formally designated contract
reader. Absent such abnormal circumstances
as fraud, corruption, or an exceeding of
authority, the arbitrator's award should be
accepted by a reviewing court as if it were
the parties' own stipulated and definitive
interpretation of the agreement. The
award of course is subject to the same
kind of challenge on the grounds of
illegality or violation of public policy as
would have been the contract itself, had it
come to the court directly without the
intervention of arbitration. But that
should also be the limit of judicial review.
If the parties themselves could lawfully
have done what the arbitrator has
ordered, the award should be affirmed
and enforced.
In construing and applying the
collective agreement, the arbitrator will
naturally employ a variety of traditional
interpretive tools. I have focused on two
controversial areas. First, I would reject
the broad reach of the plain meaning rule.
Regardless of whether contract language
appears clear and unambiguous on its
face, I would admit all credible evidence,
within the constraints of procedural
feasibility at a hearing, which goes to
show the actual intent of the parties.
Second, in spite of seemingly clear,
unambiguous contract terms, I would
accept proofs of well-established,
mutually accepted practices that indicate a
modification or amendment of those
provisions. In so doing, I am most
emphatically not trying to elevate the
arbitrator over the parties. My aim is to be
faithful to the parties' manifest intent in
the deepest, truest sense.
Finally, as a person who treasures both
tradition and autonomy, I can understand
and sympathize with all those who lament
the passing of a time when unions,
employers, and arbitrators inhabited a
self-made world of labor relations, for the
most part untouched by public law and
regulation. That day is gone. Yet we

arbitrators have always operated within
certain confines, namely, the parties' own
contractual and bargaining frameworks.
The difference is that the parties generally
had no resort from our "final and binding"
pronouncements, except to dismiss us
from their panels. Today a federal judge can
bring us up short with a one-line order.
We can adapt to this new order either
grudgingly or gracefully. My hope is that
we meet it as a challenge to the best that
is within us. I am confident no member of
this Academy lacks the capacity to handle
most of the applicable statutes and other
law and policy. Take, for example, the
concept of "discrimination" under federal
law. It is subtle and elusive. But it is not
the Internal Revenue Code. We have been
dealing with "discrimination" under unionemployer contracts for decades. We can
deal with it under public law, too. Thus, we
should not flinch from having to change
some of our customary ways. Change, after
all, is the law of growth and survival, and .
we ignore that truth at our peril.
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